// 2 CRITICAL · 2 ZERO-DAY · 3 CVE · 2 EXPLOIT IN THE LAST 24H→
Chinese espionage group ARMORY CASTLE exploited CVE-2026-123890 in VMware vCenter from September 2026, over two months before Broadcom released a patch, using the custom BONESAW tool to bypass authentication and forge SAML tokens.

On November 19, 2026, Broadcom released update VMSA-2026-0009 for a critical vulnerability in VMware vCenter, but attackers had known about it since September. The Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant documented that the Chinese espionage group ARMORY CASTLE — previously known as UNC5221 or Warp Panda — exploited CVE-2026-123890 as a zero-day for over two months, using a custom tool called BONESAW to compromise the control plane of virtualized infrastructures.

Key Takeaways
  • CVE-2026-123890 carries a CVSS 9.8 score and is an authentication bypass in the VMware Directory Service (vmdird) via DCE/RPC on TCP port 2012
  • ARMORY CASTLE used the BONESAW tool, with a build timestamp of July 13, 2026, to create sessions as administrator@vsphere.local and move laterally to ESXi and Windows VMs
  • In-the-wild exploitation is documented by GTIG in a single victim environment; Broadcom's advisory VMSA-2026-0009 does not mention active exploitation
  • CISA added the vulnerability to the KEV catalog on November 20, 2026 under Binding Operational Directive 26-04 with a November 23 deadline for federal civilian agencies

The Mechanism: How Authentication Bypass Works on vCenter

The flaw resides in the implementation of the SRP-6a (Secure Remote Password) protocol in the VMware Directory Service. According to GTIG and Mandiant, a remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit predictability in the UUIDv1 timestamp used in the SRP handshake to derive the session key, obtaining an authenticated session as administrator@vsphere.local.

The attack occurs via DCE/RPC on TCP port 2012, an interface exposed by the vmdird service. Once the session is established, the attacker gains privileged access to the Directory Service's LMDB database. GTIG documented the use of SAWSNAKE, a component of ARMORY CASTLE's toolkit dedicated to generating Golden SAML tokens that bypass multi-factor authentication.

The BONESAW malware is written in Go and its binary reports a build timestamp of July 13, 2026. GTIG notes that timestamps in Go binaries can be modified, so this date does not conclusively establish when the group discovered the vulnerability. The date nonetheless precedes the public disclosure of CVE-2026-59309, another vCenter vulnerability disclosed on July 29, 2026. Mandiant highlighted that the group knew of the flaw before July 29.

The Timeline: Exploitation Documented from September, Patch in November

GTIG reported exploitation "in early September 2026," with forensic evidence linking ARMORY CASTLE to the compromise of at least one victim through BONESAW. The zero-day vulnerability window spans at least two months and ten days, a considerable interval for an actor operating with significant resources.

The campaign employed three specialized malware sets and two zero-days, according to GTIG. Beyond BONESAW and SAWSNAKE, the identified families include SLIMSAVAGE, CAGEMATCH, BEARBONES, and LAZYBONES. This layering confirms a level of investment and planning that distinguishes APT espionage operations from opportunistic cybercrime.

"The use of three separate specialized sets of malware and two zero-days in the course of a single campaign indicates that there are significant resources supporting ARMORY CASTLE operations" — Google Threat Intelligence Group

The Control Plane as Target: Why vCenter Is Strategic

vCenter Server is the central control plane of the VMware virtualized infrastructure: it manages ESXi hosts, virtual machines, storage, and networking. Its compromise is not a breach of a single system, but the capture of the layer that governs the entire virtualized data center.

GTIG explicitly framed this reading: "Because vCenter serves as the centralized control plane for the virtualized data center, relying solely on reactive patching is insufficient to protect it." Privileged access to vCenter enables lateral movement across hosts, access to datastores containing virtual disks, and data exfiltration.

The compromise of vCenter exposes metadata stored in the LMDB database, which can include system configuration information. GTIG documented that ARMORY CASTLE used this access to extract files from Windows VMs and operate on ESXi hosts.

Analysis: The Nature of the Threat

Charles Carmakal, CTO of Mandiant, stated: "Organizations should both apply the patches and examine their systems for evidence of compromise." The source does not specify further details on the context of this statement.

The strategic reading: the combination of patching and retrospective threat hunting reflects a structural characteristic of well-resourced APT operations. The patch closes the vulnerability, but does not remove access established during the exploitation window.

What to Do Now

Recommendations from the sources are limited to specific interventions documented in the case:

  • Immediately apply patch VMSA-2026-0009 for supported vCenter versions; verify Broadcom's compatibility matrix because vCenter 7.0, out of general support since October 2025, has no public patch available
  • Conduct retrospective threat hunting focused on anomalous access to the administrator@vsphere.local account, unauthorized account creation, and DCE/RPC activity on TCP port 2012 from unmanaged hosts
  • Verify the validity of SAML tokens in vCenter's STS and search for indications of forged tokens or sessions with bypassed authentication

GTIG emphasized that reactive patching alone is insufficient to protect vCenter, given its role as a centralized control plane.

Limits of the Reconstruction

This article relies on GTIG as the primary structured source for central technical claims. GTIG documented a single victim environment; the source does not specify whether BONESAW was used against other victims beyond the one analyzed. It is unknown whether the July 13, 2026 timestamp is authentic or modified, nor exactly when ARMORY CASTLE discovered the vulnerability.

Broadcom did not mention in-the-wild exploitation in its advisory VMSA-2026-0009. Confirmation of active exploitation comes exclusively from GTIG and Mandiant.

Sources


Sources and references
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