// 4 CVE · 2 EXPLOIT IN THE LAST 24H→
Elastic Security Labs documents REF3364, a Rust toolkit that combines a kernel rootkit, a modified NVML wrapper, and Tor-based C2 to mine on GPUs while reporting zero utilization to standard monitoring tools.

This article is based on the Elastic Security Labs report dated November 12, 2026, the sole structured primary source available.

The REF3364 cluster compromised three Linux GPU hosts between October 22 and 25, 2026, using SANSAR: a Rust orchestrator that makes standard monitoring tools unreliable by combining a kernel rootkit with a tampered NVML library in userspace.

Key Takeaways
  • SANSAR version 0.1.3 manages two miners: XMRig 6.25.0 for CPU (kurt) and SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9 for GPU (tilki).
  • The NVML wrapper libnvidia-ml.so.1 intercepts calls and reports GPU utilization at 0%, with temperature 36–46°C and power 100–200W.
  • The kernel rootkit acpi_thermal_mgr.ko uses ftrace to hide processes, directories, and sockets, with persistence via initramfs.
  • The netns backdoor retrieves the C2 address from the Ethereum smart contract 0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349.
3 GPU hosts compromised in 72 hours; 16 C2 message types; 501 ms anti-debugging threshold

How It Gets In: Ray Exposed Without Authentication

The initial access documented by Elastic occurred via an internet-reachable Ray framework job agent configured to accept submissions without authentication. The timeline is precise: October 22 for initial probes, October 24 for a nvidia-smi job for hardware reconnaissance, and October 25 for a reverse shell.

Ray is widely adopted in AI/LLM infrastructure to distribute training and inference workloads across GPU clusters. The job agents that manage orchestration, if exposed, provide remote execution with elevated privileges on high-value compute systems. The exact method of escalation to root after initial access is not documented by Elastic.

The Dual Concealment Mechanism

SANSAR operates at two distinct levels of the stack. At the kernel level, the acpi_thermal_mgr.ko module — loaded via initramfs for boot persistence — uses ftrace to intercept and alter system calls related to process, file, and socket enumeration. At the userspace level, a wrapper for the NVIDIA Management Library replaces the original libnvidia-ml.so.1.

The wrapper intercepts calls from monitoring utilities and returns fabricated values: zero GPU utilization, temperature randomized in the 36–46°C (96.8–114.8°F) range, and power between 100 and 200W. The falsified values render detection thresholds based on GPU utilization useless: the compromised library is the same one standard tools read.

"A zero reading from an altered library cannot establish that a server is clean" — Elastic Security Labs, reported by CybersecurityNews

Tor, Ethereum, and the C2 Structure

SANSAR communicates with the controller through Tor, using Arti — the Tor Project's official Rust implementation — in version 0.8.1 codenamed Lyrebird. The hardcoded onion domain is efxisnqldelyr5ra25oqfrsut54b34g26e7zrsiuupsoekjof2gho2id.onion on port 9051. The C2 protocol handles 16 message types, including ShellOpen, ShellData, and ShellClose for interactive shells and StressStart for traffic generation.

Running in parallel with the main orchestrator, the netns backdoor operates on TCP port 8080 and dynamically retrieves the controller's IPv4 address by querying the Ethereum smart contract 0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349. SANSAR manages mining; netns provides backup access: two separate channels with distinct functions.

SANSAR includes anti-debugging checks: verification of the TracerPid field in /proc/self/status and a timing check with a 501-millisecond threshold. The rootkit code contains comments in Turkish; Elastic does not attribute the operation to a specific actor.

What to Do Now

Organizations expanding GPU infrastructure for AI and LLMs must verify who can submit jobs to distributed orchestration frameworks and whether GPU monitoring libraries have been tampered with. Cryptojacking diverts compute capacity from legitimate workloads and increases operational costs. This recommendation is formulated explicitly by Elastic Security Labs, cited by The Hacker News.

The actions documented in the technical report are:

  • Verify that distributed job agents (particularly Ray) are not publicly exposed without authentication.
  • Check the integrity of NVML libraries on GPU systems by comparing hashes or signatures with official NVIDIA versions.
  • Inspect kernel modules loaded at boot, paying attention to unsigned modules or those with names that mimic hardware components (acpi_thermal_mgr.ko).
  • Monitor network traffic to unusual ports and protocols, including Tor connections and queries to Ethereum smart contracts by system processes.

Analysis

The novelty of SANSAR lies not in cryptomining itself, but in the quality of its concealment. The NVML wrapper strikes the blind spot of GPU monitoring: administrators check nvidia-smi and see zero utilization, so they do not investigate. The kernel rootkit completes the picture by hiding processes even from tools like ps or ls. The use of Ethereum for C2 adds a layer of resilience: the smart contract is accessible from any node on the network, making neutralization of the command channel more complex.

The limitations of the primary source are significant. Elastic documented three hosts in a specific incident; the total scope of the campaign is not quantified. The method of escalation to root after access via Ray is unknown, as is whether the NVML wrapper was compiled on-site or distributed as a precompiled binary. The threat actor's identity remains unattributed, with the only linguistic indicator being Turkish comments in the rootkit.

For security teams, the case signals a shift in the cryptojacking threat model: no longer just theft of cycles, but compromise of the measurement tools themselves. When the library providing the data is the one altered, every threshold-based detection becomes ineffective.

Sources


Sources and references
  1. thehackernews.com
  2. elastic.co
  3. helpnetsecurity.com
  4. blog.netmanageit.com
  5. cybersecuritynews.com